Abstract-The cloud service provider offers various storage services for mass data. However, for safety and recovery concern, the provider distributes the components of the data file on different servers. Therefore it is important to design appropriate secret sharing scheme. In this paper, we hide the real secret value in a sequence of pseudo secrets in order to decrease the probability of the cheater achieving a successful guess. We also use the multiple secret sharing techniques to realize efficient distribution and reconstruction, which reduce the storage burden of the user. Furthermore, we also make some analyses of our scheme and do some comparisons. Our scheme provides better secret reconstruction and helps improve the fairness of the existing scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is a promising technology that alters the traditional storage habits of users. People could share photos, music or synchronize data files on the cloud. In the cloud storage environment, the service provider distributes the data file on different storage nodes, in order to ensure the security of the secret information. The secret sharing schemes could offer approaches to solve the issues. Thus it is of great importance to study the secure and highly efficient secret sharing scheme.
In 1979, Shamir [1] and Blakeley [2] firstly proposed the secret sharing schemes based on the Lagrange interpolation polynomial and projective geometry concepts respectively. Since then the secret sharing scheme has become an important research project. The secret sharing algorithm consists of secret distribution and secret reconstruction. Many discussions on designing secret sharing schemes have been proposed, such as verifiable secret sharing schemes [3] , multiple secret sharing [4] and secret sharing without a mutually trusted party [5] . However, the secret reconstruction scheme needs to be further studied since the unfair sharing in the traditional mechanism has to be solved.
Tompa and Woll [6] were the first to propose a fair reconstruction policy. Their idea is to conceal the real secret value s in a sequence of random values so that the cheater has to guess the correct position of s . However, the policy requires that all the participants should release their shadows synchronically which is impractical if there is no other protocol supporting it. Lin and Harn [7] proposed the first fair secret construction protocol, which we will call LH scheme for short in the following. It is also designed as hiding real secret value in a random sequence. Their scheme is not forced to synchronize and could combine with other secret sharing scheme in order to realize any secret sharing policy. However, if the sequence is short, the cheater will gain a great advantage to achieve a successful guess. In 2013, Tian et al. [8] proposed a scheme, which we will call TMPJ scheme for short in the following. They gradually release the information to realize the fairness of secret sharing. However, in 2014, Harn [9] pointed out that TMPJ scheme still had some security problems.
In TMPJ scheme, the participants have to store multiple pseudo secret shadows in each round of construction, which increases the storage burden of the participant. The multiple secret sharing schemes can solve this issue. In 2008, Pang [10] proposed a multiple secret sharing scheme using a two-variable one-way function, in which participants could reuse their secret shadows. The dealer just needs to change one parameter and each participant needs to hold only one shadow.
In this paper, we proposed a fair ( , t n ) threshold secret sharing scheme. We first devise a modified scheme using the two-variable one-way function, which is based on TMPJ scheme. In our modified scheme the participants only hold one piece of secret shadow and just reuse it in each round of reconstruction. Then we use the improved TMPJ scheme to design a new secret sharing scheme and improve the fairness. Our scheme could ensure better fairness and reduce the storage cost of the user. 
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
The scheme consists of three phases [1] .
(1) Parameter Selection
Choose a prime p which is greater than all the possible secrets and shadows. S denotes the secret value. There are n members in the system and at least t participants could recover S . And the dealer distributes the shadows to the participants. (3) Secret Reconstruction
Assume that t participants, with pair ( , )
i i
x y each, work together to recover S . They firstly compute 1 1,
which is the secret S .
B. Two-Variable One-Way Function
We consider a function as a two-variable one-way function [10] if it satisfies the following properties.
(1) Given r and x , ( , )
f r x will be easily computed.
(2) Given x and ( , ) f r x , it is hard to obtain r .
(3) For any r , it is hard to compute ( , ) f r x , without knowing x .
(4) Given r and ( , )
f r x , it is hard to obtain x .
(5) Given x , it is hard to find two different 1 r and 2 r so that
(6) Given pairs of i r and ( , ) i f r x , it is hard to compute ( ', ) f r x when ' i r r ≠ .
III. OUR CONSTRUCTION
A. Improved Scheme of TMPJ Phase 1: Parameter selection 1 , , n P P  respectively denote n participants. s ∈ ( ) GF p denotes the secret to be distributed. p denotes a prime greater than n . ' ( ) s GF p ∈ is chosen randomly as the stop indicator. The random value i α is chosen as the identification of participant i P . And ( , ) f r x is a two-variable one-way function.
Phase 2: Secret distribution
The dealer runs the following algorithm.
(1) The dealer randomly chooses n numbers, 1 , , n x x  , as the secret shadows for the participants 1 , , n P P  .
(2) The dealer randomly chooses k numbers, 10 ( 1)0 0 0 , , , , ,
. Set the value of ( 1) 
to construct the n th polynomial
(6) Release system parameters p , ' s and parameter
Phase 3: Secret reconstruction
Every m ( ) m t > participants could cooperate to recover the secret value s . Here we suppose the first m participants will succeed. Otherwise, participant j P announces that there is a malicious participant in the system and halts the protocol. Otherwise, participant j P announces that there is malicious participants in the system and halts the protocol. , it means that there is a malicious participant and the protocol will be halted. Otherwise, it means that all the participants act honestly in this round.
Participant j P will compute and send the next pseudo secret ( , )
to the other participants.
(12) If every step in (7)~(12) could be executed correctly, then
i X g = will be calculated. If ' X s ≠ , this means that all the participants act honestly in this round of reconstruction. j P will compute and send the next pseudo secret to the other participants.
(13) According to the above description, when ' X s = , the participant obtains all the secret shadows used for construction. Therefore, the secret value can be recovered as 
B. A new fair (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme
Phase 2: Secret distribution
(1) The dealer randomly chooses 1 k + unique numbers to form a ( 1) k + -elements sequence
(2) For each i s S ∈ , in the distribution phase of i s , the protocol in section Ⅲ-A will be executed correctly. As in the improved scheme of TMPJ, the Dealer distributes the secret shadows of different sub-secrets by changing parameter r in the two-variable one-way function ( , ) s .
Phase 3: Secret reconstruction
(4) In order to reconstruct each element in S , the algorithm is executed correctly as the protocol described in section Ⅲ-A. In the r th round, each participant j P presents his pseudo secret share
s . Until the ( 1) l − th round, all the participants recover the constant term ' s of the polynomial, and they can finally get i s .
(5) When all the participants of any qualified subset reconstruct the secret value, they have to reconstruct 
IV. COMPARISONS
A. Fairness
In LH scheme, the dealer conceals the real secret value s in the k -elements sequence and uses an indicator to point out the location of s . However, if the dishonest participant successfully guesses the correct location of s , he will exclusively obtain s , while the other participants cannot, and the probability is 1/ k . Assume the case that k is very small, such as 2 k = , the dishonest participants will obtain s with the probability of 1/ 2 . This largely decreases the security level of this scheme.
In TMPJ scheme, the dealer breaks the secret shadow of the participants into sub-secrets. The scheme is novel and decreases the probability of the dishonest participant obtaining s to
− . However, after 1 l − round computations, the dishonest participant can use the secret shadow derived in each round to reconstruct s . The fairness of the scheme still needs to be improved.
Our scheme is inspired by LH scheme and TMPJ scheme. We improve both of the two schemes and construct a fair ( , t n ) threshold secret sharing scheme. In our scheme, the probability of a dishonest participant exclusively obtaining s is not greater 
B. Efficiency
In our construction, we introduce the two-variable one-way function ( , ) f r x . For the case of multiple unique secret values, by changing the value of r , we distribute the secret shadow for each participant only once. Therefore the participants only need to store one piece of secret shadow each during the secret sharing process. We highly reduce the storage cost of the participants, while in TMPJ scheme multiple secret shadows need to be released.
We make a comparison of the efficiency in the secret reconstruction phase in In LH scheme, for a k -elements sequence, t participants are cooperating to reconstruct the secret. There will be 1 L + round operations, and in each operation, the computational cost of the Lagrange interpolation polynomial will be ( ) L T t .
In TMPJ scheme，for a k -elements sequence, m ( ) m t > participants are cooperating to reconstruct the secret. There will be l round operations. In each operation, the computational cost of the Lagrange interpolation polynomial will be ( ) L T t and the computational cost of polynomial verification will be ( ) p m t T − .
In our scheme, we hide the real secret value s in the kelements sequence S . When recovering each i s in S , we use the improved TMPJ scheme which executes l round computations. And we will execute the operation 1 L + times.
Although our scheme has some loss in efficiency, however, we improve the fairness and security. Therefore it is an applicable scheme.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the fair reconstruction of the secret value. By using the two-variable one-way function, we improve the TMPJ scheme and realize multi-secret sharing. Based on our improvement, we propose a new fair secret sharing scheme. In the reconstruction phase, we use Lagrange interpolation polynomial and polynomial verification to detect whether there is a dishonest participant in the system. Once the cheater is detected, the protocol halts immediately. Moreover, we hide the real secret value in the sequence in order to decrease the probability of the cheater achieving a successful guess and improve the fairness.
